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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE INSURANCE
UNDERWRITING CYCLE
Tom Baker*
Between the idea and the reality,
Between the motion and the act,
Falls the shadow.1
INTRODUCTION
The insurance underwriting cycle has become a touchstone in the
debate over medical malpractice reform.  On the one hand, trial law-
yers and others who seek to preserve existing medical malpractice lia-
bility rules commonly report that the high-priced, “hard market”
phase of the liability insurance underwriting cycle, and not real devel-
opments in malpractice litigation, fueled the medical malpractice in-
surance crises of the mid-1970s, mid-1980s, and early 2000s.2  On the
other hand, medical associations and others who seek further restric-
tive tort reforms claim that those crises represented the long overdue
consequences of escalating tort costs that the competitive, “soft mar-
ket” phase of the insurance underwriting cycle had allowed people to
wish away.3  Each side accuses the other of using the insurance under-
* Connecticut Mutual Professor and Director, Insurance Law Center, University of Connect-
icut School of Law.  Thank you to: Matthew Dolan, Tammi Dulberger, Sean Fitzpatrick, Chris-
tian Lahnstein, Ralph Winter, and participants at the 2004 American Association of Law Schools
annual meeting and the 2004 Clifford Symposium for helpful discussions; Brian Glenn, Sean
Fitzpatrick, Peter Siegelman, and Ralph Winter for helpful comments on an earlier draft; and
Thomas Farrish and John Maroney for research assistance.  During the recent hard market I
prepared reports for a trial lawyers association and for a leading insurer.  Each helped me de-
velop my understanding of the insurance underwriting cycle.  I do not have a continuing relation-
ship with either organization.
1. T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE
1225, 1227 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 2d ed. 1985).  Thanks to Matthew Dolan, Repeating the Sins of
Market Cycles, INSIGHTS, Oct. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.onebeaconpro.com/insights/
insights_vol2_sp.pdf.
2. The American Trial Lawyers Association and their allies point to the analysis of Robert
Hunter as reported in, for example, J. Robert Hunter, Consumer Advocate Challenges Insurers
on “Crisis” In Med Mal Mkt, NAT’L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS
MGMT. EDITION, Oct. 7, 2002, at 10, 10.
3. See generally, e.g., Robert F. Wolf, Actuary Counters Hunter on Med Mal Insurance Crisis,
NAT’L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Nov. 11, 2002, at
10, 10.
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writing cycle to obfuscate the real issues and achieve policy prefer-
ences that have little to do with medical malpractice insurance prices.
Like all good spin, these stories about the underwriting cycle work
from an underlying partial truth.  Nothing concentrates the minds of
legislators on the alleged excesses of malpractice liability more than
doctors who are angry about skyrocketing insurance premiums; and
the immediate driver of those skyrocketing premiums surely was the
change in the underwriting climate.4  Litigation behavior and malprac-
tice claim payments did not change in any significant, systemic sense
between 1970 and 1975, between 1981 and 1986, or between 1996 and
2001.5  What changed, instead, were insurance market conditions and
the investment and cost projections that the insurance market built
into medical malpractice insurance premiums over those periods.6  In-
surers that had offered low prices based on rosy scenarios in 1970,
1981, and 1996 switched to high prices based on pessimistic scenarios
in 1975, 1986, and 2001.
On the other hand, medical malpractice claim payments did in fact
increase more rapidly than medical malpractice insurance premiums
during the years leading up to each hard market.7   A “hard” turn in
an insurance underwriting cycle comes when insurers collectively re-
spond to the fact that the prevailing premiums cannot support future
claim payments, whether because claims costs have been higher than
projected or investment income has been lower than projected, or
some combination of the two.  In the long run at least, medical mal-
practice insurance prices must bear a reasonable relationship to medi-
4. See infra text accompanying notes 29–33. R
5. See generally, e.g., David J. Nye & Donald G. Gifford, The Myth of the Liability Insurance
Claims Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal, 41 VAND. L. REV. 909 (1988); Neil Vidmar et al.,
Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 315 (2005). See also infra note 70.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 29–33. R
7. This is not to say that they are too high.  Since 1975, insured medical malpractice losses
have constituted a relatively constant share of U.S. health care dollars.  From 1975 to 2001, loss
costs in this line rose 986% in nominal terms and 230% in real terms. See A.M. BEST CO.,
AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES PROPERTY/CASUALTY (1985 and 2002 eds.) (these percentages
are derived from more than one edition).  During the same period, the U.S. population increased
by 32%, and GDP grew 516% in nominal terms and 128% in real terms.  During this period, the
percentage of the GDP accounted for by “health services” grew 69% (from 3.5% to 5.9%),
which helps place the growth of medical liability losses in perspective.  U.S. Dep’t of Comm.,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Industry Economic Accounts, Gross Domestic Product by Indus-
try Area (last updated Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/gdpby-
ind_data.htm (linking to GDP data reports for 1977 to 2003).  If medical malpractice losses had
constituted a constant share of health services costs over the 1975 to 2001 period, we would have
expected real growth of 216% over that period, which is very close to what occurred.
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cal malpractice claim costs, or else insurers will not be able to pay
claims as they become due.8
Lost in the recent efforts to take political advantage of (or explain
away) the insurance premium spikes of the hard market is any real
attempt to understand how the underwriting cycle works, why it is so
severe in medical malpractice insurance, and what it might mean for
the ability of malpractice liability to deliver on its risk distribution,
loss prevention, and corrective justice objectives.  This Article at-
tempts to fill that gap.
Part II provides a primer on the liability insurance underwriting cy-
cle that draws on the research prompted by the mid-1980s insurance
hard market.  This Part explains that the recent dramatic increases in
predicted medical malpractice losses are a result of the insurance cy-
cle, not dramatic changes in medical malpractice claim payments.
Part III explores why the underwriting cycle is so severe in medical
malpractice insurance.  This Part explains my recent Geneva Lecture
analysis of liability risks9 within the specific context of medical mal-
practice and with a fuller consideration of the dynamics of the under-
writing cycle.  In short, the cycle is so severe because of the following
two reasons: first, there is a relatively long period between the time
that the premiums for a medical malpractice policy are paid and the
time that losses under that policy can be known with certainty; and
second, there is more uncertainty regarding future medical malprac-
tice losses than many other kinds of losses.
Part IV explores whether insurance regulators should consider
moderating the underwriting cycle (assuming that they could do so).
In this Part, I argue that there are good reasons to believe that medi-
cal malpractice insurance crises lead medical providers to improve pa-
tient safety and, therefore, that efforts to moderate the cycle could
have a negative impact on patient safety.  Further research is needed
before we can draw firm conclusions, but leaving the insurance cycle
alone would be the wiser course for now.
8. Recent econometric research shows that state-by-state variations in malpractice insurance
premiums over a ten-year period cannot be explained using state by state variations in claims
payments. See KATHERINE BAICKER & AMITABH CHANDRA, THE EFFECT OF MALPRACTICE
LIABILITY ON THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10709, 2004).  This suggests that the relationship between claim payments and premi-
ums need not be as close as commonly assumed by economic theorists.
9. See Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 128 (2004).
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II. A PRIMER ON THE INSURANCE UNDERWRITING CYCLE
The insurance underwriting cycle is an insurance industry specific
business cycle that consists of alternating periods in which insurance is
priced below cost (a “soft” market) and periods in which insurance is
priced above cost (a “hard” market).10  Notably, coverage is plentiful
and nonprice terms are favorable to policyholders when the insurance
is sold below cost, while coverage is restricted and nonprice terms are
unfavorable to policyholders when the insurance is priced above
cost.11  This cycle presents a puzzle to industry insiders and outsiders
alike, who all wonder why the “good stuff” is sold cheaply one year,
becomes hard to get at almost any price one or two years later, is
widely and cheaply available just a few years after that, and then is
almost certain to disappear once again at some uncertain point in the
future.
“Cost” is the most important word in the simple definition with
which I began and is the key to understanding the insurance under-
writing cycle.  The meaning of insurance “cost” implied in this defini-
tion involves a retrospective perspective that insurers cannot adopt
when setting prices.  At the time insurers set their prices, most of the
costs of the insurance coverage will be incurred only in the future.  As
a result, insurers constantly have to imagine the future to decide how
to price their products today.  This situation creates a remarkably high
degree of uncertainty in insurance pricing, especially as compared to
products like potato chips, automobiles, and sneakers, and even as
compared to most other services, as I will explain.  This uncertainty
about insurance costs is the fuel that drives the underwriting cycle.
A. Setting the Stage: Uncertainty in Insurance Pricing and Reserving
Consider a book of malpractice insurance policies sold to obstetri-
cians in the State of Illinois during 2004.  What is the “cost” of those
policies?  By convention, the insurance industry and insurance regula-
tors separate insurance costs into two categories: the administrative
costs involved in selling and servicing the policies (referred to as “un-
derwriting expenses”), and the costs associated with paying the claims
10. Although I will refer throughout this Article to “the” insurance underwriting cycle, each
line of insurance may well be subject to its own cycle. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear Is the Key: A
Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 257 (2004).  Although my anal-
ysis of the underwriting cycle should apply to other types of liability insurance, this Article
makes a careful study only of medical malpractice insurance.  Questions such as “Are all types of
liability insurance subject to the same underwriting cycle?” and “What is the relationship of
cycles in different lines of insurance?” are beyond the scope of this Article.
11. In the remainder of this Article, I will use “price” as shorthand for all the aspects of the
insurance contract that fluctuate with the underwriting cycle.
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that will eventually be made under the policies (referred to as “loss
expenses”).12  It is the latter category comprising loss expenses that is
the most uncertain and is also the most important.  For medical mal-
practice insurance, aggregate loss expenses are five times as large as
aggregate underwriting expenses.13
When the insurer sells the 2004 policies, the only loss expenses that
can be assigned to the policies are projections of what may take place
in the future.  This means that the “costs” the insurer uses to calculate
the premiums are, in an important sense, imaginary.  Yes, they can be
estimated based on claims paid under policies sold in previous years,
but the future is never exactly like the past.  Different obstetricians
are insured, obstetrical technology and practice routines change, and
the liability environment evolves.  As a result, past claims costs are an
imperfect and possibly misleading guide to future claims costs; thus,
judgment is required.
Despite the high level of uncertainty involved in making such pre-
dictions, the insurer must make them, and, notably, these predictions
have immediate financial consequences.  As a matter of prudence
(and by legal requirement in most instances), the insurer must set
“reserves” that are equal to the amount needed to pay future claims
under any policies it sells and then must set aside assets to offset those
reserves.14  These assets are real money, which cannot be used for any
other purpose other than earning investment income.  Thus, reserves
have an immediate effect on profit and loss.15
The reserves for new insurance policies are first posted in a cate-
gory assigned to “incurred but not reported” (IBNR) claims.  As
claims come in, claims personnel will transfer reserves from the IBNR
reserves to the “case reserves” they set up for specific claims.  At any
given time, the total IBNR and case reserves assigned to a given set of
insurance policies is supposed to constitute the best judgment of all
the future loss expenses to be paid under those policies.  If the case
reserves draw down the IBNR reserves more quickly than anticipated,
the insurer is supposed to increase the IBNR reserves and set aside
additional assets to offset those increased IBNR reserves.  The assets
to offset such “reserve strengthening” must come from somewhere,
either from assets freed up by “releases” of reserves from other sets of
12. See generally A.M. BEST CO., supra note 7. R
13. See id. at 276.
14. As should be apparent, this is a simplified explanation that ignores important details such
as the timing of earned premiums and, for the moment, investment income.
15. Please note that confusion can result from the multiple uses of the word “loss” in the
insurance field.  For example, “loss” in the sense of “loss expenses” is very different from “loss”
in the sense of “profit and loss.”  I will endeavor to be clear in my use of the word.
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policies (possibly resulting in those policies being under-reserved) or
from revenue not yet assigned to other purposes.16
The total of paid claims and reserves assigned to a set of policies
(plus administrative expenses that I will ignore) equals the “loss ex-
penses” for those policies.  Over time, the composition of the loss ex-
penses for a set of policies gradually shifts from 100 percent IBNR
reserves, to an evolving proportion of paid claims, case specific
reserves and IBNR reserves, and eventually to 100 percent paid claims
in the end (many years after the policy is sold).  In theory, the loss
expenses for the policies sold in a particular year should become more
certain over time as the proportion of loss expenses shifts from IBNR
reserves to paid claims, though developments in the asbestos liability
area have made liability insurers wary of ever claiming complete cer-
tainty.17  Depending on the kind of insurance, it can take years for
insurers to reach the point when paid claims constitute even half of
the loss expenses for the policies sold in a given year.
Figure 1 shows the accumulation of paid claims over time for the
U.S. insurance market for three different kinds of liability insurance
sold in 1992: automobile, “occurrence” form medical malpractice, and
“claims-made” form medical malpractice.18  The vertical axis on Fig-
ure 1 represents the percentage of what we now know to be the total
loss expenses for the 1992 policy year that were paid as of the date
indicated on the horizontal axis.  As Figure 1 shows, both forms of
medical malpractice insurance pay out claim dollars more slowly than
automobile liability insurance, and the occurrence form of medical
malpractice insurance pays out more slowly than the claims-made
form.  In the language of the insurance trade, the length of the payout
period is referred to as the “tail” of the insurance policy.19  The longer
the tail, the longer it takes for an insurer to know its true costs for any
given set of policies.  Both kinds of medical malpractice insurance
have a longer “tail” than automobile liability insurance.
There are three main points to draw from this simplified explana-
tion of insurance pricing and reserving.  First, liability insurance costs
16. This description of insurance accounting is based on informal interviews with underwrit-
ers, actuaries, and claims personnel from both insurance and reinsurance companies.
17. Review & Outlook: At Last, An Asbestos Solution, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2004, at A12.
18. Occurrence form medical malpractice insurance provides coverage for injuries resulting
from medical services provided during the policy period while claims-made form medical mal-
practice insurance provides coverage for injuries relating to claims reported during the policy
period. See ROBERT JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (3d ed. 2002).  Data for Figure 1
was obtained from A.M. BEST CO., AGGREGATES & AVERAGES PROPERTY/CASUALTY UNITED
STATES & CANADA (2003).
19. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 9, at 128. R
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FIGURE 1
PAID LOSSES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOSS INCURRED, 1992
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are uncertain at the time of sale, principally because of the problem of
predicting future claims costs.  Second, a longer “tail” magnifies the
uncertainty, because liability claim costs become increasingly difficult
to predict the farther into the future we look.  Third, and most impor-
tant for purposes of understanding the underwriting cycle, a longer
tail multiplies the effect of changes in the assumptions an insurer uses
to predict loss expenses.
This third point and its significance may not be obvious, so I will
provide an intuitive explanation and an example.  The key intuition is
that a change in assumptions about loss expenses can affect, not only
claims under policies being sold this year, but also claims that are not
yet paid under policies sold in the past.  The existence of claims not
yet paid under policies already sold creates what some economists
have called a “risk overhang.”20   The longer the tail in a given line of
insurance is, the greater the risk overhang; and the greater the risk
overhang is, the larger the proportion of loss expenses that remains
unpaid, and thus subject to revaluation if there is a change in assump-
tions.  In long tail lines of insurance, a change in assumptions has a
20. See generally Anne Gron & Andrew Winton, Risk Overhang and Market Behavior, 74 J.
BUS. 591 (2001).  Although the term “risk overhang” appears to be new to Gron and Winton, the
compounding effect of lengthening the insurance tail was already well understood.  Gron and
Winton’s interesting new insight is that risk overhang can lead a diversified insurer to find itself
in a position with an unexpected concentration in one set of correlated risks (e.g., medical mal-
practice) leading it to sharply reduce, and even curtail, underwriting those risks in order to bal-
ance its portfolio. See id. at 593.
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compounding effect that can lead to a dramatic need for new reserves
and, thus, additional assets to offset those reserves when the future
suddenly looks more expensive than insurers had been projecting.
This compounding effect can create dramatic losses (in the profit and
loss sense) when the future suddenly looks more expensive than insur-
ers had been projecting, and correspondingly dramatic profits when
the future suddenly looks less expensive than insurers had been
projecting.
Changes in assumptions regarding medical price inflation provide a
good example.  Imagine that an insurer setting prices for 1998 policies
decided that managed care was doing such a good job of controlling
medical inflation that medical costs could be expected to increase no
faster than the general rate of inflation in the economy, approximately
two percent per year.  Imagine, further, that the insurer decided that,
as in the past, medical malpractice insurance claim costs would in-
crease at the rate of medical price inflation.  So a claim that was worth
$1 million in 1998 could be expected to be worth about $1.1 million in
2003.
Now imagine that the insurer finds out in 2000 that medical infla-
tion returned to its old ways and was proceeding at a rate that was
double that of the economy as a whole (i.e., four percent).  That
means that a claim that was worth $1 million in 1998 would be worth
$1.22 million in 2003, rather than the $1.1 million that the insurer pro-
jected when it set the premium, and likewise for all other claims under
policies already sold and priced based on the “wrong” assumption
about medical price inflation.  It is too late to collect additional premi-
ums for policies already sold, and because the new understanding will
affect all outstanding policies there are unlikely to be “excess”
reserves from other years that can be released to make up the
shortfall in the 1998 policies.  So the money to fund the additional
assets that must be set aside to offset the newly strengthened reserves
has to come from insurer capital or from revenue generated by new
policies, leading to a potentially dramatic dip in profits for the year.
The higher the percentage of loss expenses that remain outstanding
under the old policies, the more additional assets the insurer needs to
set aside.  This compounding effect explains the dramatic accounting
losses insurers experience at the start of a hard market.
The length of the tail has a similar effect in the other direction when
insurers adjust their assumptions in a manner that reduces projected
loss expenses.  Not only will the insurer have lower projected loss ex-
penses for new policies, but it can also release reserves set aside to pay
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claims under the policies it already sold, leading to potentially signifi-
cant profits during the year of the release.
B. Traditional Economic Explanations: The Fundamentals,
Asymmetric Information, and Capacity Constraint21
Thus far, the explanation of “cost” makes it clear that liability insur-
ance pricing and reserving is an uncertain business22 and that seem-
ingly small changes in loss expense assumptions can lead to large
changes in reserving.  This uncertainty and reserve compounding
alone, however, does not explain the cyclical pattern of insurance pric-
ing and reserving.  All by itself, uncertainty would be expected to pro-
duce a pattern of pricing and reserving that looks something like the
array of darts around a bull’s eye, not a pattern of darts clustered first
to the left of the bull’s eye and then to the right.  Moreover, the com-
pounding effect that new assumptions have on reserves should not
produce correspondingly compounded changes in insurance pricing,
because prices in a competitive market should be set at the amount
needed to cover future loss expenses, without regard to insurers’
profit and loss under past policies.
Economists begin their explanations of the underwriting cycle with
what they refer to as the following “fundamentals” of insurance pric-
ing: underwriting and loss expenses; the degree of uncertainty about
those expenses; the length of the tail; the interest rate that can be
earned on reserves (a proxy for actual investment returns); and the
cost of holding capital.23  These are the “fundamentals” of insurance
pricing because, taken together, they constitute the cost of providing
insurance.  Because these fundamentals cannot explain many aspects
of the underwriting cycle, however, economists have looked to addi-
tional factors to understand the cycle.  The most widely cited addi-
21. The analysis in this section is heavily indebted to the review of the underwriting cycle
literature in Scott E. Harrington, Tort Liability, Insurance Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: 2004 (Robert E. Liton & Richard
Herring eds., 2004).  Professor Harrington should not be held responsible for my treatment of
the economic literature.
22. Cf. RICHARD ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, AND
THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE (2004) (documenting the very high degree of uncertainty in many
lines of insurance).
23. See also generally J. DAVID CUMMINS ET AL., CYCLES AND CRISES IN PROPERTY/CASU-
ALTY INSURANCE: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Scott E. Harrington & Rob-
ert W. Klein eds., 1991); Harrington, supra note 21, at 3; Scott E. Harrington & Greg Niehaus, R
Volatility and Underwriting Cycles, in THE HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 1 (Georges Dionne ed.,
2000).  As reflected in Figure 1, there is a relatively long period between the time that the pre-
mium is paid and the time that claims are paid in medical malpractice insurance.  Thus, interest
earned on investments is an important part of medical malpractice insurance revenue.  Declining
investment returns lead to premium increases.
\\server05\productn\D\DPL\54-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-MAY-05 11:05
402 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:393
tional factors include “capacity constraint,”24 and “asymmetric
information.”25  In addition, some economists have begun to take
more seriously the behavioral and institutional explanations preferred
by industry insiders.26
With regard to all these explanations, it is worth keeping in mind
the cautionary observations of Emilio Venezian, author of one of the
more significant articles on the insurance underwriting cycle:
Reality, however, is much more complex.  Ratemaking methods
change from time to time; the economy goes through periodic
changes and occasional convulsions.  Short of developing a general
model of insurance in a dynamic economy, it is impossible to prove,
in any sense of that word, that a particular process (such as
ratemaking or response to changing interest rates, unanticipated
changes in interest rates, or changes in other sectors of the eco-
nomic, regulatory, or managerial environment) contributes to the
cycle.  In this context, if a particular process is plausible and leads to
predicted cyclical characteristics similar to those that are observed,
it seems reasonable to infer that the process may contribute to the
cycle.27
In that spirit, the goal of the discussion that follows is not to provide a
definitive explanation of the causes of the liability underwriting cycle,
but rather to evaluate potential contributing factors in order to de-
velop a workable understanding that can inform policy debates re-
garding medical malpractice and other kinds of liability.
1. Loss Costs, Per Se, Do Not Explain the Cycle
The main problem with using cost factors to explain the underwrit-
ing cycle is that, with the exception of interest rates28 and the related
factor of capital costs, there is no exogenous explanation for any cy-
cles in those cost factors.  While there are cycles in insurers’ loss ex-
pense projections, these cycles are products of the insurance industry
itself, not of something outside.  Surprisingly, this point has not re-
24. See discussion on capacity constraint infra Part II.B.5. See generally, e.g., Anne Gron,
Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets, 25 RAND J. ECON. 110
(1994) [hereinafter Gron, Capacity Constraints]; Anne Gron, Evidence of Capacity Constraints in
Insurance Markets, 37 J.L. & ECON. 349 (1994) [hereinafter Gron, Evidence]; Ralph A. Winter,
The Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 3 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 379 (1994). See also
review of this literature in Harrington, supra note 21, at 13–16. R
25. See discussion on asymmetric information infra Part II.B.4. See generally, e.g., Neil A.
Doherty & Lisa L. Posey, Availability Crises in Insurance Markets: Optimal Contracts with Asym-
metric Information and Capacity Constraints, 15 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 55 (1997).
26. See discussion infra Part II.C. See generally, e.g., Scott E. Harrington & Patricia M.
Danzon, Price Cutting in Liability Insurance Markets, 67 J. BUS. 511 (1994).
27. Emilio C. Venzian, Ratemaking Methods and Profit Cycles in Property and Liability Insur-
ance, 52 J. RISK & INS. 477, 479 (1985) (citations omitted).
28. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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ceived the attention that it should in underwriting cycle literature,
which tends to treat insurers’ projections of costs as a “black box” that
does not need to be opened.29  Figure 2 below and the paragraphs that
follow illustrate and explain this point.
FIGURE 2
U.S. MED MAL OPERATING PROFIT AND LOSS
EXPERIENCE, 1980–2003
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Note that there are three different lines plotted on Figure 2: the
before-tax operating profit margin in U.S. medical malpractice insur-
ance; the “developed” loss expenses on policies sold in a given year
29. For example, Harrington’s recent analysis of the underwriting cycle states the following:
“Unless reported losses are biased substantially upward, these simple calculations imply that
growth in cost and declines in interest rates may account for the bulk of growth in premiums
during the current hard market.”  Harrington, supra note 21, at 16.  Having made that observa- R
tion, he does not explore the possibility that the reported losses are biased upward.  Indeed, he
concludes his paper by stating that “there is little doubt that ‘much’ of the volatility in insurance
premium rates—whether for general liability insurance or other types of coverage—is attributa-
ble to variation in the discounted value of expected claim costs.” Id. at 30.  In other words, he
“explains” one insurance cycle by reference to another insurance cycle, thereby begging the
following question: “What is it about the insurance industry that causes cycles in expected claims
costs?”  He offers a partial answer to this question by reference to the “winner’s curse” that I
discuss below. See discussion infra Part II.C.  Similarly, although Professors Gron and Winton
acknowledge the possibility of reserve management in order to “smooth” income (see Gron &
Winton, supra note 20, at 121), they use “unexpected changes in insurer costs” as the primary R
explanation for the temporary capacity shortages and treat those “unexpected changes” as exog-
enous. Id. at 596.  Finally, Professors Cummins and Danzon rely on the mid-1980s loss shock as
the explanation for the onset of the subsequent hard market. See generally J. David Cummins &
Patricia M. Danzon, Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance Markets, 6 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 3 (1997).  For an important exception to the general tendency to treat insurer
cost projections as a black box, see David Bradford & Kyle Logue, The Influence of Income Tax
Rules on Insurance Reserves, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 275 (Kenneth A. Froot
ed., 1999).
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(as calculated ten years after the policies were sold, or as of the end of
2003, whichever is earlier); and the “initial incurred” loss expenses on
policies sold in a given year (i.e., the predicted losses reported at the
end of the year the policies were sold).30
The first line to focus on is the solid line showing the before-tax
operating profit margins in U.S. medical malpractice insurance from
1980 to 2003.31  This line should be read using the percent vertical axis
on the left side of Figure 2, together with the horizontal axis showing
the year.  This line depicts the well known features of the underwrit-
ing cycle: a profit valley in the final years of both the 1980s and 1990s
soft markets, followed soon after by a profit peak.  By 2003, the mar-
ket had passed the profit valley, and was on an upward trend.
The second line to focus on is the dashed line showing the devel-
oped accident year loss expense.  This line should be read using the
$1000s vertical axis on the right side of Figure 2, together with the
horizontal axis showing the year.  This “developed” accident year loss
expense line reflects the total of paid claims and remaining incurred
loss expenses as of ten years after the policies were sold,32 and, for
policies sold since 1994, the total of paid claims and incurred loss ex-
penses as of the end of 2003.  As reflected in Figure 1 earlier, over
ninety percent of claim payments are made within ten years after the
policy year; thus, the developed loss expenses for the years 1994 and
earlier represented on Figure 2 come close to the actual loss expense
experience.  The line becomes increasingly less “developed” the closer
it gets to 2003.  The developed loss expense line reflects a slow but
steady increase in medical malpractice loss expenses over the indi-
30. Initial incurred loss and developed loss data are from A.M. BEST CO., AGGREGATES &
AVERAGES PROPERTY/CASUALTY UNITED STATES & CANADA, Schedule P, Part 1F, §§ 1–2
(1985 and 2004 eds.).  Where there were differences between the figures provided by different
editions, I used the latest edition.  Operating profit data is from id. (the “operating profit” can be
computed from the “overall operating ratio” as follows: 100 – overall operating ratio = operating
profit).
31. The operating profit margin is the sum of the investment profit margin and the underwrit-
ing profit margin.  The investment profit margin is the sum of the investment income plus capital
gains realized during the year expressed as a percentage of the premiums earned during the year
((income + gains) ÷ premium × 100%).  The underwriting profit margin is the sum of the pre-
mium earned during the year minus the underwriting and loss expenses incurred during the year,
expressed as a percentage of the earned premium ((premium – expenses) ÷ premium × 100%).
The “loss expenses incurred” during the year include all of the losses incurred on policies sold in
that year (paid claims plus posted reserves) plus any revisions in reported incurred losses for
earlier years. See generally Harrington, supra note 21.  The inclusion of these revisions means R
that reserve strengthening reduces profit during the year of strengthening while a reserve release
increases profit during the year of the release.
32. I selected ten years because Best’s Aggregates and Averages separately reports losses by
policy year only for ten years after the policy year. See, e.g., A.M. BEST CO., supra note 7. R
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cated years, with the exception of a relatively flat period from 1986 to
1989 that seems most likely to be the result of a reduction in supply of
insurance sold during the mid-1980s hard market (when deductibles
were increased and limits rationed) as well as the mid-1980s tort
reforms.33
The final line to focus on is the dotted line showing the initially
reported accident year loss expenses.  This line also should be read
using the $1000s vertical axis on the right side, together with the hori-
zontal axis showing the year.  The “initial incurred” accident year loss
expense amounts reflect the predicted loss expenses for the policies
sold in the indicated year, as valued at the end of the year in which the
policies were sold.  Notice how the initial incurred loss expenses jump
dramatically at the low point in the profit cycle (1985 and 2001) and
grow very slowly at all other times.  Also notice the relationship be-
tween the initial incurred loss expense line and the developed loss ex-
pense line.  The initial incurred loss expense line remains above the
developed loss expense line following the hard market “jump,” indi-
cating that insurers set their initial reserves at a higher level than
needed to pay claims.  Toward the end of the soft market, the initial
incurred loss expense line crosses the developed loss expense line, in-
dicating that insurers set their initial reserves at a lower level than
needed to pay claims, until the next hard market “jump” in initial in-
curred loss expenses.  As Figure 2 helps illustrate, the hard market
jumps in initial incurred loss expenses are part of the underwriting
cycle, not an explanation for the cycle.
Figure 3 presents a second graphical picture of the underwriting cy-
cle.  Figure 3 shows the yearly change in initial incurred loss and in
paid claims, controlling for medical inflation and using the operating
profit as a point of reference.34  As we already know, there is a close
33. See Patricia H. Born et al., The Distribution of the Insurance Market Effects of Tort Liabil-
ity Reforms, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 55–105
(1998); W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liabil-
ity Reform, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 484 (1995).  It is worth noting that a careful study of the
reduction in developed losses that was attributable to the hard market reduction in supply would
be a valuable contribution to the underwriting cycle literature because the reduction in quantity
has previously been regarded as unobservable. See Gron, Evidence, supra note 24, at 351; Ralph R
A. Winter, Discussion of Scott Harrington’s Paper 1 (Jan. 8–9, 2004) (unpublished paper from
the Brookings Conference on Public Policy Issues Confronting the Insurance Industry, on file
with author) (noting that the price and quantity of insurance are unobservable from the publicly
available data because that data reports only the revenue).  Using developed losses as a proxy
for the quantity of insurance sold (controlling for the effects of tort reform) could be a useful
way of comparing the price of insurance over time.
34. Unfortunately, Best’s Aggregates and Averages did not report paid claim data for medical
liability insurance for years earlier than 1989. See generally, e.g., A.M. BEST CO., supra note 7. R
For medical inflation, I computed an annual rate using Bureau of Labor Statistics annual Medi-
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relationship between the profit cycle and changes in initial incurred
loss.  For most years, other than hard market years, initial incurred
losses increase at or below the rate of medical inflation.  By contrast,
there is not a close relationship between the profit cycle and paid
claims.  For paid claims there is a comparatively erratic upward trend
and the years of rapid “real” increases in the rate of change do not
occur in tandem with the underwriting cycle.35  Upon reflection, the
closer connection between incurred losses and the cycle makes sense.
Incurred losses represent predictions about the future and, as will be
discussed in greater detail below,36 predictions about future costs are
more responsive to short term institutional and behavioral dynamics
than actual money paid to claimants and lawyers.
2. Interest Rates Help Explain Shifts in the Direction and the
Amplitude of the Cycle
In contrast to loss expenses, fluctuations in interest rates and other
forms of investment returns appear to provide a partial explanation
for the underwriting cycle.37  The insurance market is not large rela-
tive to the economy as a whole;38 thus, changes in interest rates that
are correlated with the underwriting cycle seem more likely to be a
“cause” of the cycle than the reverse.  This causal relationship makes
sense because interest rates directly affect the investment profit com-
ponent of the operating profit.  The higher the interest rate, the fewer
assets needed today to pay a claim five years from now.  Similarly, the
lower the interest rate, the more assets needed today.  As a result,
changes in interest rates can have an effect on insurance pricing that is
cal Care Consumer Price Index reading. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX—ALL URBAN CONSUMERS MEDICAL CARE SERVICES (2004).
35. Because I have only a few years of data on paid claims, I cannot make a detailed analysis.
Nevertheless, I predict that there is some connection between paid claims and the profit cycle
due to changes in underwriting standards and prices over the course of the cycle.  During a hard
market, consumers tend to purchase policies with higher deductibles and lower limits than dur-
ing a soft market.  We can think of a hard market as a tightening of the “spigot” that controls the
supply of insurance and a soft market as a loosening of that spigot.  The tightening and loosening
would seem to have a lagged effect on claim payments.  This would be a worthy question for
research.
36. See discussion infra Part II.C.
37. The U.S. insurance literature commonly treats interest rates as a proxy for investment
return rates.  As long as assets are principally invested in bonds, this practice seems sound.  The
company Swiss Re reports that European insurers tend to be more heavily invested in equities,
with the result that interest rates may not be a good proxy for the investment return rate. See
Kurt Karl et al., Capital Markets and Insurance Cycles, 4 J. RISK FIN. 40, 43 (2003).
38. In 2002, the insurance industry accounted for 2.4% of the GDP.  Brian C. Moyer et al.,
Improved Annual Industry Accounts for 1998–2003 (June 2004), available at http://
www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2004/06June/0604GDP_Industry.pdf.
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FIGURE 3
U.S. CHANGE IN MED MAL INITIAL INCURRED LOSS,
CONTROLLING FOR MEDICAL INFLATION, 1980–2002
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similar to changes in assumptions about future loss expenses.39  Un-
like changes in loss expenses, however, interest rates affect not only
the size of insurers’ liabilities, but also the value of insurers’ assets.  A
decline in the interest rate simultaneously increases the amount of
funds that must be set aside to pay future claims and decreases the
value of the assets that the insurer previously has set aside to pay
those claims.40
As Professor Harrington and others have pointed out, the recent
hard market and the hard market of the mid-1980s followed a signifi-
cant decline in interest rates.41  On the other hand, not every shift in
39. See Robert T. McGee, The Cycle in Property/Casualty Insurance, 11 FED. RES. BANK N.Y.
Q. REV. 22 (1986) (describing impact of interest rates on property/casualty insurance).  In many
states, medical malpractice is subject to an exception to the statutory accounting rule that insur-
ers are not supposed to discount reserves in most lines of insurance to take future investment
returns into account. See, e.g., OKLA. ANN. STAT. tit. 36, § 1509.C.1 (West Supp. 2004).  Thus,
interest rate changes will have an effect on both reserves and investment income in the medical
malpractice line.
40. See Neil A. Doherty & James R. Garven, Insurance Cycles: Interest Rates and the Capacity
Constraint Model, 68 J. BUS. 383, 386 (2001).  The practice of buying bonds and holding them to
maturity limits the compounding effect of changes in interest rates because the returns on the
bonds purchased when the policies were sold are already locked in.  If I have adequately
matched my bond portfolio to my projected claim payment stream, a change in interest rates
today need not affect my reserving under policies sold in the past.  Doherty and Garven note
that property-liability insurers “do not manage their assets and liabilities in a manner that mini-
mizes the interest rate sensitivity of their equity.” Id. at 402.
41. See Harrington, supra note 21, at 15. R
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the direction of interest rates leads to a shift in the direction of the
insurance cycle.  For example, the late 1994 peak in long-term interest
rates did not produce a hard market, and long-term interest rates de-
clined almost as significantly from 1994 to 1998 as they did during the
2000 to 2003 period.42  Moreover, even when the cycle shifts in re-
sponse to a decline in interest rates, the decline in investment returns
explains only part of the price increases.43  Nevertheless, the consen-
sus appears to be that interest rates do provide an important, if incom-
plete, explanation for the underwriting cycle.44
3. The Length of the Tail and Other Factors that Affect Uncertainty
About Loss Costs Help Explain the Amplitude of the Cycle
Although interest rates are the only cost factor that help explain
why there is a cycle in insurance prices, some of the other cost factors
help explain the “amplitude” of the cycle.  Two important factors are
the length of the tail and the degree of uncertainty about loss costs.
The length of the tail affects the amplitude of the cycle for the rea-
son discussed above: the longer the tail is, the greater the risk over-
hang will be and, therefore, the greater the effect that changed
assumptions will have on insurance reserving and profits.45  Sharply
increased projections of future loss expenses are a defining character-
istic of the onset of a hard market in liability insurance.  The longer
the tail, the greater the compounding effect of the newly pessimistic
projections and, thus, the deeper the losses (in the profit and loss
sense) at the start of the hard market.  As Professors Gron and Win-
42. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, MONETARY TRENDS 9 (Aug. 2004), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/mt/20040801/mtpub.pdf (showing monetary trends
from 1987–2004).  As Kyle Logue has explained, there are similar problems in attributing the
mid-1980s hard market exclusively to interest rates:
Fluctuations in interest rates alone, however, do not fully explain the crisis. First, the
facts simply do not match the theory. Interest rates rose sharply during the late 1970s
and peaked in 1981. This was followed in 1982 and again in 1983 by a substantial drop
in rates. In 1984, interest rates increased modestly and then declined again in 1985 and
1986. If premium movements were inversely related to and primarily determined by
interest rate movements, it is difficult to explain why the property-casualty market re-
mained soft (i.e., why premiums remained low) until late 1984 and early 1985.
Kyle D. Logue, Toward a Tax-Based Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 82 VA. L. REV.
895, 909 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
43. See Harrington, supra note 21, at 14–17. R
44. See id.  See also Doherty & Garven, supra note 40, at 385 (reporting that interest rates R
explain long-term relationships between premiums and costs but do not adequately explain the
periodic hard markets); Martin F. Grace & Julie L. Hotchkiss, External Impacts on the Property-
Liability Insurance Cycle, 62 J. RISK & INS. 738 (1995). But see McGee, supra note 39, at 22 R
(attributing a close connection between interest rate cycles and the property/casualty insurance
cycle).
45. See supra text accompanying note 20. R
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ton have suggested, this compounding effect can lead an insurer to cut
back dramatically on future sales in a particular line of insurance as
the insurer attempts to balance its portfolio of risks.46   A long tail has
a similar compounding effect on reserve releases as assumptions about
future loss expenses or investment gains become more optimistic dur-
ing the soft phase of the underwriting cycle.  Of course, it is this cycle
between pessimistic and optimistic assumptions about future losses
that none of the factors addressed so far have helped us to
understand.
The cost factor “degree of uncertainty about loss expenses” is a gen-
eral category for other factors, besides the length of the tail, that af-
fect insurers’ confidence regarding projections of future loss expenses.
The main point of my Geneva Lecture, Insuring Liability Risks, was to
develop a conceptual framework for describing and comparing the
kinds of uncertainties faced by liability insurers.47  Figure 4 presents
this framework in schematic form.  For present purposes, the details of
these “development risks” are not important.  It is sufficient to know
that various kinds of uncertainty about future loss expenses can be
described and compared.  As I will discuss in Part III, the uncertain-
ties associated with these various kinds of development risks help ex-
plain why the underwriting cycle has such a dramatic effect on medical
malpractice insurance prices as compared to automobile liability in-
surance prices.
As with uncertainty generally, these development risks do not ex-
plain the existence of the underwriting cycle.  Returning to the
dartboard metaphor, greater development risks would be expected to
increase the spread of the darts around the bull’s eye, but would not
be expected to increase the likelihood that all the darts would go to
the left of a target for a period and then for another period to the right
of the target.  Given the existence of the underwriting cycle, however,
greater development risks lead to wider swings in that cycle because
the behavioral and institutional forces48 place a cyclical pressure on
predictions about the future.49  The more uncertain the future is, the
more room for this pressure to affect those predictions.
46. See generally Gron & Winton, supra note 20.  One analogy would be to a retirement ac- R
count seeking to maintain half of the investment in stocks; a rising stock market results in sale of
stock and purchase of other kinds of assets in order to maintain the desired balance of risk in the
portfolio.
47. See generally Baker, supra note 9. R
48. See discussion on behavioral and institutional forces infra Part II.C.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 81–99. R
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FIGURE 4
LIABILITY DEVELOPMENTS RISK
Injury Developments
Injury Cost Developments
Standard of Care Developments
Claiming Developments
Legal Developments
4. The Role of Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information is a default explanation for almost any in-
surance-related phenomenon, and the insurance underwriting cycle is
no exception.50  The twin asymmetric information problems affecting
insurance transactions are “adverse selection” and “moral hazard.”
“Adverse selection” refers to the problem created when only one
party to a transaction has private information about the quality or risk
associated with a transaction, in a situation in which the other party is
choosing among a range of potential contracting parties.51  Because
the party without the information cannot assess the quality (risk level)
of any particular contracting partner, it really has no choice but to
offer a price that is based on the average quality/risk level in the mar-
ket as a whole.  This price is very appealing to people who privately
know that they are offering a low-quality/high-risk transaction, but
not very appealing to people who privately know that they are offer-
ing a high-quality/low-risk transaction.  In this situation, the low-qual-
ity/high-risk people tend to deal, while the high-quality/low-risk
people tend not to deal, with the result that the market is dominated
50. See generally, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis, 96 YALE L.J. 1521
(1987).
51. See generally Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, in RISK & MORALITY 258 (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003).
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by low-quality/high-risk transactions.52  I stress “privately,” because
an insurer that is able to distinguish between low and high risks can
easily prevent adverse selection by offering insureds different prices.
This explains why adverse selection is said to be a problem of asym-
metric information.
In the insurance context, observers are concerned about adverse se-
lection “spirals” which can occur when insurers raise prices to reflect
the increased risk level of the pool, which drives low-risk insureds out
of the pool and leads insurers to increase prices further, thereby driv-
ing more low-risk insureds out of the pool, and so on.53  Such spirals
can occur, however, only when the insurer either is not technically
able to assess the risks of applicants who themselves have reliable in-
formation about their risk, or is not permitted to make distinctions
among applicants who themselves have reliable information about
their risk.54
Because the mid-1980s hard market was understood to follow a pe-
riod in which the tort system became fundamentally more risky,55
some observers concluded that the hard market resulted from, or was
exacerbated by, decisions by low-risk insureds to opt out of liability
insurance, setting off an adverse selection spiral.56  There are serious
problems with this account, however, even assuming it is based on an
accurate judgment about tort law developments.57  To cause an ad-
verse selection spiral, it is not enough that the expansion of tort liabil-
ity made some entities more risky.  The entities that became more
risky were aware of their increased risk, and able to conceal that infor-
mation from liability insurers.  Especially in a period of rapid change
in liability law, liability insurers would tend to be more aware than
52. See George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970).
53. See Priest, supra note 50, at 1541–42. R
54. See generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
55. See generally, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical His-
tory of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); George
L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1987).
56. See Priest, supra note 50, at 1541–42. R
57. Gary Schwartz has persuasively argued that the claimed shift to strict “enterprise liability”
never happened. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise
of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of
Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981).  With that said, however,
there is little doubt that tort liability did increase over the period, and, although the mechanism
was expansion of negligence liability rather than the adoption of a new liability framework, in-
creased tort liability is broadly consistent with the risk spreading and loss preventing goals of
enterprise liability, despite tort law’s steadfast refusal to jettison fault. See Robert L. Rabin,
Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190, 1193 (1996).
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insureds about the direction and impact of legal change.  Moreover, in
a true adverse selection spiral, the liability insurance market should
contract, not only in terms of the number of entities insured (which
does occur during hard markets) but also in terms of the total premi-
ums paid (which does not occur in hard markets).  In fact, the total
premiums paid in each of the most recent hard markets increased sig-
nificantly.58  For these reasons, it seems unlikely that adverse selection
has played an important role in the underwriting cycle.59
“Moral hazard” provides a somewhat more promising explanation,
at least for the soft market phase of the underwriting cycle.  “Moral
hazard” refers to the reduced incentive to avoid loss that can accom-
pany insurance.60  There are two kinds of “insurance” that protect
market participants from the losses that may follow from the below-
cost pricing that takes place toward the end of a soft market.61  One
form of “insurance” is the limited liability of insurance companies,
which protects shareholders from losing more than the value of their
shares.  There is some evidence that this downside protection may
lead insurance companies with fewer assets to take the risky step of
selling insurance below cost in order to increase market share with the
hope that they will survive long enough to reap the benefits of this
market share in the eventual hard market.62  The second form of “in-
surance” that protects market participants from the consequences of
below-cost pricing is the network of state insurance guaranty funds.63
Depending on the kind of loss, the insurance guaranty funds pay all or
a substantial portion of the insolvent insurer’s obligations.64  This sec-
ond form of insurance reduces the incentive of policyholders to assess
whether the company charging the low price will be solvent at the
point of claim.
58. See Winter, supra note 33, at 3. R
59. Another objection to Professor Priest’s adverse selection account is that the gradual ex-
pansion of tort liability in the 1960–85 period may have raised risk generally within existing risk
classifications and, thus, did not create the increased risk heterogeneity that is necessary for
adverse selection to have had the claimed effect.  Discussions with Seth Chandler sharpened my
appreciation of this point.
60. See generally CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING
MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE RATES (1985); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,
75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
61. See Harrington & Danzon, supra note 26, at 512. R
62. Id. at 519.
63. See generally James G. Bohn & Brian J. Hall, The Costs of Insurance Company Failures, in
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 139 (David F. Bradford ed., 1998).
64. Medical malpractice insurance would be subject to the general liability insurance claim
limit of $300,000 in the states that have adopted the NAIC Model Property/Casualty Guarantee
Fund Act. See POST-ASSESSMENT PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIA-
TION MODEL ACT § 8(A)(1)(a)(iii) (1996) (on file with the DePaul Law Review).
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Given the dynamics of the insurance market discussed below,65 low
prices by one company can lead to low prices by others, prolonging
the soft market.  Thus, the moral hazard of limited liability and state
insurance guaranty funds may help explain price cutting in the soft
market phase of the cycle.
5. Capacity Constraint Provides a Partial Explanation, Particularly
for Hard Markets
The leading additional explanation for the underwriting cycle is “ca-
pacity constraint.”66  “Capacity” refers to the amount of insurance
that an insurer, or the market as a whole, can offer at one time, and is
a function of the capital held by the insurer or the market.  Capacity is
“constrained” because there are transaction costs associated with rais-
ing new capital, with the result that internal capital enjoys a cost ad-
vantage over external capital.  The existence of the capacity constraint
is consistent with reports of people in the insurance business, and it is
supported by econometric analysis.67
Economists point to two main effects of the capacity constraint,
both of which are consistent with the observed characteristics of the
underwriting cycle.  First, because external capital is more expensive
than internal capital, a sudden loss of capital will produce a short-term
shift in the supply curve, a drop in the quantity of insurance that is
sold, and a sharp rise in insurance prices and profits, followed slowly
by increased capitalization.68  Second, because there is a cost advan-
tage to internal capital, insurers will be reluctant to release capital.69
65. See discussion infra Part II.C.
66. See Winter, supra note 24, at 380–82. R
67. See, e.g., Seungmook Choi et al., The Property/Liability Insurance Cycle: A Comparison of
Alternative Models, 68 S. ECON. J. 530, 531 (2002) (reviewing prior literature and testing capacity
constraint theory against alternative models of the insurance market). See also Kenneth A.
Froot, Introduction to THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK, supra note 29, at 8 (discussing R
claim by Warren Buffet that the size of Berkshire Hathaway gives that company a competitive
advantage in the insurance market, a claim that is inconsistent with traditional economic under-
standing of capital markets but consistent with capacity constraint).
68. See, e.g., Gron, Capacity Constraints, supra note 24, at 112. R
69. Ralph A. Winter provides the following explanations for insurer inability, and possibly
reluctance, to release capital:
A . . . key feature of the property-liability insurance market is that internal equity is less
costly than external equity.  By this I mean that a cost is incurred in the “round trip” of
paying out a substantial amount of retained earnings in cash to shareholders and then
immediately raising the same amount through the issuance of equity. . . . One explana-
tion for this difference in costs is the superiority of information of firm managers over
outside suppliers of equity.  The argument is that issuing external equity signals that
expected profits are relatively low.  A second advantage to internal equity derives from
the “trapped equity effect” of dividend taxation.  Finally, an industry-specific regulation
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Capacity constraint is very important to the traditional economic
understanding of the underwriting cycle because it helps explain why
prices can rise so sharply when there is relatively little change in the
underlying pattern of claim payments.70  In a competitive market, in-
surers should not be able to raise prices today to make up for past
losses.  If they did, new insurers would enter the market and offer a
lower price based solely on the cost of providing the insurance policies
of today.  In fact, new capital pours into insurance during a hard mar-
ket, but not immediately.71  The fact that capacity is constrained gives
insurers “room” to raise prices beyond what is needed to pay the
claims of today, and thereby recover for the accounting losses that
resulted from inadequate pricing and reserving during the later years
of the soft market.  This does not mean that the risk overhang from
the soft market dictates the prices of the hard market, but rather that
the prices that can be set during the hard market appear to be suffi-
cient to allow most insurers to manage that risk overhang.
Something approaching a consensus appears in economics litera-
ture, that the capacity constraint explanation offers a substantial im-
provement on explanations that rely purely on the fundamentals (i.e.,
costs, interest rates).72  Yet it is far from a complete explanation for at
least two reasons.
First, the capacity constraint explanation fits descriptively much bet-
ter with the sudden shift to a highly profitable hard market than it
does with the slow descent to the unprofitable end of the soft mar-
ket.73  The fact that an insurer wants to reserve capital to get ready for
an eventual hard market (because internal capital is cheaper than ex-
ternal capital) does not explain why the insurer sells insurance at
discourages the exit of equity from the market: insurers are constrained in most states
against distributing more than 10% of net worth to shareholders in any year.
Winter, supra note 24, at 382–83 (footnotes omitted). R
70. Correspondence with Ralph A. Winter sharpened my appreciation of this point. See Let-
ter from Ralph A. Winter, Canada Research Chair in Business Economics and Policy, to Tom
Baker, Director of Insurance Law Center at University of Connecticut School of Law (Mar. 17,
2004) (on file with the author and the DePaul Law Review).
71. The dramatic amount of capital raised in Bermuda during the recent hard market is a
demonstration of this competitive dynamic.  One of the selling points of the new Bermuda rein-
surers was that, because they were new, they did not have any “legacy” problems. See, e.g.,
Douglas McLeod, Face of Market Is Changing as Companies Exit, Enter, BUS. INS., Nov. 10,
2003, at 10.
72. See Harrington, supra note 21, at 17–21 (citing, e.g., Winter, Gron, and Froot). See gener- R
ally Choi et al., supra note 67. But see Cummins & Danzon, supra note 29 (concluding that price R
increases during the mid-80s hard market resulted from capital inflows, rather than the reverse).
73. See Harrington & Danzon, supra note 26, at 512. R
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prices that significantly impair internal capital in the meantime.74  Sec-
ond, the capacity constraint explanation, like the traditional “funda-
mentals” explanation, slips too easily into treating sudden changes in
expected loss costs as an exogenous cause of the cycle, rather than an
aspect of the cycle that needs to be explained.  For example, some
economists point to a loss cost “shock” that reduced property casualty
insurance capacity at the onset of both the 1970s and 1980s hard mar-
ket.75  Yet, as socio-legal research has demonstrated (and as Figure 2
confirms from the 1980s and 1990s period), there were no sudden
changes in the underlying liability litigation.76  Instead, there were
slow but steady increases in liability claiming costs.  The shock was in
initial incurred losses, not paid claim dollars.  For that reason, the bet-
ter understanding would seem to be that the shock was part of the
cycle, not a cause of it.
74. It is, of course, an empirical question whether the rate of capacity destruction during soft
markets is greater than the difference between internal and external capacity.  Because of the
income “smoothing” that is taking place simultaneously, this question may well be
unanswerable.
75. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 24, at 406–07. See also Cummins & Danzon, supra note 29 R
(disagreeing with Winter and Gron regarding the effect of the capacity constraint, and relying
strongly on the loss cost shock as an exogenous event). Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF
TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 1, 6–15 (1986) (attributing
the mid-1980s hard market to a sudden sharp increase in tort litigation).
76. The litigation explosion myth has two main parts: (1) the number of tort claims has in-
creased dramatically out of proportion to the increase in population, and (2) the size of tort
payments in individual cases has increased out of proportion to the underlying injury costs.
Neither part is supported by empirical research.  For research debunking part one, see, for exam-
ple, Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996)
(showing, for example, that tort filings are declining in state courts and that the increase in
federal court tort filings in the 1980s was attributable to asbestos claims). See also BRIAN J.
OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 23
(1995) (demonstrating that the short-term rise in state court tort filings in mid-1980s was attribu-
table to automobile claims).  For research debunking part two, see, for example, Seth A. Seabury
et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (2004) (stating that
“[n]ot only do we show that real average awards have grown by less than real income over the 40
years in our sample, we also find that essentially all of this growth can be explained by changes in
observable case characteristics and claimed economic losses (particularly claimed medical
costs)”). See also Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and
the Jury, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (2000); Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80
TEX. L. REV. 2073 (2002). Cf. Evan Osborne, Courts as Casinos? An Empirical Investigation of
Randomness and Efficiency in Civil Litigation, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 187 (1999).  Even George L.
Priest, who concluded that tort law changes produced the 1980s hard market, agreed that the raw
increases in litigation activity and jury verdicts did not explain the extent of the price increases.
See Priest, supra note 50, at 1533–34.  Priest explained that “[n]o trial or settlement statistics . . . R
have shown increases that even remotely correspond to the increases in insurance premiums at
multiples of four, five, ten, fifteen, and more over a period of a few months.” Id.
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While capacity constraint seems likely to have exacerbated these
hard markets, it does not provide a persuasive explanation for the
necessary key ingredient: the preceding prolonged soft market.  If pre-
miums are less than needed to pay future claims, it is a certainty that
premiums will have to rise eventually, and rise sharply in lines of in-
surance with substantial risk overhang.  Once premiums are up, insur-
ers can revise their loss reserves accordingly.  Thus, the causal arrow
does not necessarily point from sharply increased loss reserves to
sharply increased prices.  It may well point in the other direction—
from increased prices to increased loss reserves, particularly in the
case of insurers that entered the hard market in relatively strong fi-
nancial condition.  In other words, sudden increases in loss costs are
an effect of the shift to the hard market rather than a cause.77  And
even when the causal arrow points from increased reserves to in-
creased prices, the “cause” of the increased reserves is in large part
endogenous (i.e., recognition of the fact that reserves had been too
low in the past) and not a response to something new originating
outside the industry.
The importance of the soft market trigger can be demonstrated by
observing insurance prices following Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  Hur-
ricane Andrew came about as close as is possible to providing a truly
exogenous shock to the capital position of the property casualty indus-
try.78  Yet, despite the fact that Andrew temporarily depressed prop-
erty casualty insurer profits, it did not produce a broad hard market.79
Why?  Apparently because property casualty insurers were still in the
77. Ralph A. Winter offered the following observation in correspondence:
If you, as an insurer, suddenly increase premiums by a huge amount for whatever un-
derlying economic reasons, then there will be pressure on you to increase accounting
reserves (1) to avoid income tax; and (2) to meet the pressures of rationalizing your
premium increase through accounting costs.  This pressure may come from policyhold-
ers; it may be there to avoid pressure from shareholders, who might wonder why last
year’s premiums were so low, if costs were the same as this year; it may come from
regulators who may be perceived to keep an eye out for excessive premiums.  With so
much freedom in setting reserves, why not set them at a level that justifies the more
fundamental price increases?
Ralph A. Winter, supra note 70, at 3. Cf. Mary Weiss, A Multivariate Analysis of Loss Reserving R
Estimates in Property-Liability Insurers, 52 J. RISK & INS. 199 (1985) (discussing income
“smoothing” by insurers), cited in Gron, Capacity Constraints, supra note 24, at 121 n.28. R
78. Although Hurricane Andrew certainly was endogenous, the earlier hurricane loss models
were not; thus the “cause” of the capital shock was the combination of Hurricane Andrew and
the models.
79. Except, briefly, in the catastrophic reinsurance market, which is disproportionately ex-
posed to natural disasters. See Gron & Winton, supra note 20. See also Karl, supra note 37, at R
40.
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fat years following a hard market.80  The failure of the four hurricanes
of 2004 to produce a broad, sharp rise in property insurance premiums
is consistent with this explanation.
C. Behavioral and Institutional Explanations
As the discussion of capacity constraint highlighted, prolonged soft
markets present the most significant challenge to rational actor ac-
counts of the underwriting cycle.  Given a soft market, an eventual
shift to a hard market is inevitable because below-cost pricing eventu-
ally will destroy enough capacity to produce the effects of the capacity
constraint.  While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what precipitates
the shift, something eventually will, although not necessarily the same
thing each time.81  Once the shift occurs, capacity constraint and risk
overhang go a long way toward explaining the otherwise puzzling
combination of suddenly smaller quantity and higher prices at the bot-
toming out of the profit cycle.  But capacity constraint and risk over-
hang do not persuasively explain what causes the soft markets that
produce the hard markets.
1. Industry Insider Accounts: Psychology and Institutions
Industry insider accounts of the underwriting cycle consistently rank
psychology, institutional incentives, and competitive behavior well
ahead of interest rates or loss costs.  The psychological accounts stress
the emotions of greed and fear.  Greed leads to the irrational competi-
tion, price cutting, and eventual capital erosion of the soft market.
80. It is quite interesting to note that liability insurance profits experienced a sharp drop at
approximately the same time, also without producing a hard market.  Harrington reports that
this drop in liability profits was due to reserve strengthening on policies that were more than ten
years old (presumably for asbestos and environmental liabilities). See Harrington, supra note 21 R
at 7, 14.  Harrington speculates that this liability reserve strengthening did not produce a hard
market because it did not indicate a long-term shift in loss costs (possibly because more recent
policies exclude asbestos and environmental claims, though he did not offer that explanation).
Id.  I speculate that insurers chose that period to strengthen the old reserves because Hurricane
Andrew provided a way for them to explain a temporary decline in profits and because Wall
Street’s focus on the future encourages publicly traded companies to report lots of bad news all
at once, especially if that bad news can be explained as the result of unique events that do not
impair future revenue streams. See generally Andrew T. Berry, Comments on Aggregation:
Some Unintended Consequences of Aggregative Disposition Procedures, 31 SETON HALL L. REV.
920 (2001).
81. See generally, e.g., Logue, supra note 41 (persuasively explaining that changes in the taxa-
tion of insurer reserves may have been an important cause of the mid-1980s hard market). Cf.
Gron, Capacity Constraints, supra note 24 (describing insurance cycles “as the result of slow R
adjustment to random shocks, rather than a phenomenon that repeats with a particular
periodicity”).
\\server05\productn\D\DPL\54-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 26 10-MAY-05 11:05
418 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:393
Once the bad news sinks in, fear takes over, and insurers react in the
opposite direction.82
The institutional explanations stress senior management and Wall
Street focus on “calendar year” results and the related practice of
benchmarking performance in terms of current revenue and market
share, rather than “accident year” results, together with the ebb and
flow of bureaucratic power between revenue producers (sales and un-
derwriting) and the gatekeepers of corporate profitability (actuarial
and claims).83  Using market share and revenue as benchmarks drives
the focus on calendar year results down to underwriters.  When the
annual bonus depends on hitting revenue targets, underwriters will be
loathe to turn away business because prices are too low.84  Given the
uncertainties involved in insurance pricing, this incentive structure
cannot help but bias decisionmaking in favor of optimistic views about
the future.  Perhaps as a result, liability insurance industry folklore is
full of stories about underwriters who “write and run,” banking their
82. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 10. Cf. Dolan, supra note 1. R
83. Sean M. Fitzpatrick writes:
[I]nsurance companies measure profitability from several viewpoints – most impor-
tantly from the perspectives of “accident year” and “calendar year” results.  In an “ac-
cident year” analysis, losses are matched to premiums written in the year those losses
arose.  In “calendar year” analysis, however, losses incurred (that is, paid or reserved)
in a given year are netted against premiums earned in that same year, irrespective of
when the losses being paid first arose.  Simplistically speaking, an underwriter or actu-
ary will look to accident year results to determine how profitable a line of business has
been, while a chief financial officer or a shareholder will look to calendar year results to
determine how a company is doing from a purely financial perspective in the current
period.
Of course, it doesn’t take our friend Warren Buffet to figure out that the two views
may yield very different answers to the question: How are we doing? – depending on
the growth characteristics of a book of business.   For example, a company which is
growing its premium base quickly can continue to report positive calendar year under-
writing results – for a while anyway – even if its accident year results from prior years
are deteriorating, because the old losses are being compared to the current periods’
larger premium base.  A company whose premium base is shrinking, on the other hand,
will be saddled with untenable calendar year results even if its accident year results are
improving.  This creates a significant disincentive for companies to shrink their books
of business even when that would seem to be the prudent course from a pure under-
writing perspective, as if demands of investors for continuing revenue and earnings
growth were not a sufficient disincentive.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 267–68 (footnotes omitted). R
84. Sean M. Fitzpatrick also states:
[C]ompetition for revenue and market share . . . drives the day-to-day behavior of un-
derwriters to a far greater degree than concerns with ultimate profitability.  Underwrit-
ers – like everyone else in business – are motivated by (i) the desire for financial
reward and (ii) fear of losing employment or opportunities for advancement.  And,
during all but the absolute peaks of the underwriting cycle, underwriters are evaluated
according to the amount of premium they can generate.
Id. at 264.
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bonuses and changing companies or divisions before credible accident
year results come in.85
The emphasis on revenue increases the power of revenue producers
over the claims and actuarial departments, with the result that the ac-
tuarial department comes under great pressure to re-examine the
more pessimistic aspects of its loss projections and the claims depart-
ment comes under pressure to weed out “excess” reserves.86  The re-
sult is that an increasingly optimistic view of the future will resonate in
both case and IBNR reserves.  Once the hard market shift occurs,
however, the claims and actuarial departments gain greater power
(particularly if they have been careful to leave a record of discrete
complaints about the soft market pressure), with the result that both
case and IBNR reserves are adjusted sharply upward to reflect a much
more pessimistic view of the future.87  Using the emotional terms re-
ferred to above, we might say that revenue producers hold the upper
hand on the cost factors used to produce prices during the “greed”
phase of the cycle, while claims and actuarial departments hold the
upper hand during the “fear” phase.
The competitive behavior explanation also turns on revenue and
market share.  Senior executives who are focused on revenue and
market share will use capital to maintain revenue and market share in
a soft market rather than distributing the capital to shareholders or
holding it in an investment account.88  If enough insurance companies
are focused on market share and revenue, competition will drive down
prices as long as decisionmakers perceive that there is excess capac-
ity.89  In that environment, senior managers of a company who de-
cided to go against the flow and hold their company’s excess capacity
in an investment account (i.e., “cash”) might find themselves out of a
job as a result of a takeover by another insurance company that would
85. Id. at 266.
86. I base this observation on discussions with property and casualty actuaries and claims
personnel from leading insurance companies, who would not authorize me to identify them or
their company. See id. at 268 (“it is not surprising that representatives of the more ‘conservative’
functions within an insurance company—claims adjusters, for example—are relatively less em-
powered so long as calendar year results remain good”).
87. This bureaucratic dynamic echoes that between the sales and claims functions of insurance
companies explored in Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims
Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395 (1994).
88. See generally Dolan, supra note 1. R
89. Query whether focusing on market share rather than (or along with) profit makes sense
even for a stock insurer in lines of insurance in which policyholders tend to stay with an insur-
ance company and do not continually shop on the basis of price.  If you can be reasonably cer-
tain that the customer you attract (or keep) during a soft market will stay with you when the
market turns hard, then using capacity to cut prices may well be a form of investment.
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use the cash to increase market share.90  At the same time, the capital
market’s focus on future revenue streams encourages rapid and mas-
sive reserving corrections as soon as the hard market begins, thereby
putting the bad news behind.91  As this suggests, it seems likely that
the insurance underwriting cycle is, at least in part, an artifact of the
way that the capital market values insurance companies.
The incentive for mutual insurers would seem to be even more
strongly weighted toward spending cash to increase market share, not-
withstanding their reduced exposure to the capital markets.  Excess
capacity presents a mutual insurer with a choice among holding cash,
returning a dividend to current or former policyholders, and investing
in new business.  Keeping the cash for a rainy day is an option, but
that could lead regulators to force a distribution.  Given the owner-
ship structure of mutual insurers, there is no effective way that current
policyholders could force a distribution,92 and no market for owner-
ship that could curb management’s preference to spend the cash to
increase market share.93  The rational choice for a mutual insurer
would seem to be paying just enough of a dividend to current (but not
former) policyholders to discourage future price shopping,94 but using
most of the money to cut prices to get new policyholders in the door
and to prevent existing policyholders from leaving to get a lower price
somewhere else.  If this analysis is right, then having a critical mass of
mutual insurers may be a significant factor in price cutting in liability
insurance markets.95
90. Query whether a soft market presents managers with some of the same incentives as the
end of a growth or stock bubble.  It becomes increasingly difficult to live up to the expectations,
but there are perceived to be great negative consequences to being the first management team to
cry “uncle.”
91. See generally Berry, supra note 80. R
92. Cf. Theodore Allegaert, Derivative Actions by Policyholders on Behalf of Mutual Insur-
ance Companies, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063 (1996) (explaining the difficulty of bringing derivative
actions).
93. See JERRY, supra note 18, at 52 (explaining that mutuals are owned by their R
policyholders).
94. Paying a dividend would seem to discourage price shopping in two ways.  First, it would
tend to make policyholders happy with the company, thus reducing the likelihood that they
would consider price shopping.  Second, it makes price shopping more difficult to do, because it
demonstrates to the policyholder that the “sticker price” for insurance may not be the final price,
because of the possibility of later dividends.
95. Some support for this analysis can be found in Patricia Born et al., Organizational Form
and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks Versus Mutuals, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTRO-
PHE RISK, supra note 29, at 167 (using data from 1984 to 1991 to find that stock companies are R
more likely than mutual companies to reduce their business in low profit years and increase it in
high profit years, a difference that produces noticeably significant business flows in the medical
malpractice line).  This study provides only limited support for this analysis, however, because
the study uses underwriting profit as the measure of profit.  Underwriting profit is determined
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2. The Winner’s Curse and Herd Behavior
The concepts of the “winner’s curse” and “herd behavior” may help
provide an additional behavioral gloss on the explanations of industry
insiders.  When buyers choose among sellers on price, there will be a
bias toward insurers who offer lower prices.  Thus, even if underwrit-
ers on average are accurate in their predictions of the future, the mar-
ket will select against pessimistic underwriters in favor of optimistic
underwriters.96  The “winners” in the competition for market share
are the optimistic, low-pricing insurers.  The “curse” is the logical re-
sult of this process: in the end, premiums may well be insufficient to
pay the claims.  The insurers offering a lower price are not necessarily
behaving irrationally; they may simply reach more optimistic conclu-
sions from uncertain data.  Using the dartboard metaphor, it is as if
the darts are thrown in a random pattern, but only those heading to
the left of the bull’s eye are allowed to land on the board.97
Watching premiums flow to other, lower-pricing insurers would lead
any underwriter to wonder what it is that the other companies know
that he or she does not and to re-examine the pricing assumptions;
and no one would be surprised when the underwriter decides that
those assumptions were too pessimistic and revises one’s prices so that
they are more in line with those being offered elsewhere in the mar-
ket.  Such “herd behavior” is a rational response to many kinds of
decisions under conditions of uncertainty: “If I’m wrong, at least I
won’t be alone.”98  Given that there is no absolute measure of success
in the insurance business, a decision that involves a substantial risk of
being just as wrong as everyone else exposes the decisionmaker to
on the basis of “incurred” rather than “developed” losses.  Because of the underreporting of
losses in incurred losses toward the end of the soft market, it is possible that stock insurers did
not reduce their market share until the onset of the hard market.
96. Cf. Harrington & Danzon, supra note 26, at 520–21 (introducing the concept of winner’s R
curse into underwriting cycle literature). See also McGee, supra note 39, at 22 (describing win- R
ner’s curse dynamic in connection with inflation projections without using the term “winner’s
curse”).  For a general discussion of the winner’s curse, see Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The
Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 191 (1988).
97. The obvious question is this: “Why do insurers not protect themselves against the winner’s
curse?”  Insurers should have a good understanding of their market and the institutional incen-
tives.  We should not lightly expect that they would tolerate below-cost pricing, unless it bene-
fited them in the long run.  It is possible that there are benefits to market share, such that it is
rational to “spend” capital by maintaining market share during the soft market in order to reap
the high profits of the hard market and, therefore, that there is in fact no “curse.”  For the
moment, this is an important open question.
98. ROBERT SHILLER, FROM EFFICIENT MARKET THEORY TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 14–18
(Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 1385, 2002); Sushil Bikhchandai & Sunil Sharma, Herd
Behavior in Financial Markets, 47 IMF STAFF PAPERS 279, 280–81 (2001); David Scharfstein &
Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 466 (1990).
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much less potential career risk than a decision that involves even a
small risk of being wildly more wrong than others.99  Returning to the
dartboard metaphor, all the underwriters aim their darts to the left of
the bull’s eye for a while, not because they are colluding and not be-
cause they are foolish, but rather because there is safety in numbers.
Once the hard market switch is flipped and capacity contracts, they
quite rationally adjust their aim sharply to the right.
III. THE UNDERWRITING CYCLE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
The general discussion of the underwriting cycle in Part II identified
the following potentially significant contributors to the underwriting
cycle:
• Interest rate cycles;
• The length of the liability insurance tail;
• Other factors affecting loss expense uncertainty;
• Moral hazard;
• Capacity constraint;
• Greed and fear;
• Institutional incentives; and
• The winner’s curse and herd behavior.
The discussion in this Part will explore how these factors might affect
medical malpractice insurance pricing.
A. Interest Rate Cycles
Interest rates, per se, do not affect medical malpractice insurance in
any special way.  The comparatively long length of the tail exposes
medical malpractice liability insurance to interest shifts, to the extent
that risk is not hedged, but that increased vulnerability is a function of
the tail, not interest rates.
B. The Length of the Tail
As reflected in Figure 1, medical malpractice insurance has a com-
paratively long tail, even when that insurance is sold on a claims-made
basis.  In many jurisdictions, the tail is particularly long for insurance
sold to medical providers who work with children, because of the ex-
tended statute of limitations for claims brought by or on behalf of
children.
As discussed above, a longer tail produces a larger risk overhang
and, thus, wider swings of the underwriting cycle.  With that said, how-
99. And if the safer decision also produces the bigger bonus, all the better.
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ever, it is important not to overstate the significance of the tail to the
recent “crisis” in medical malpractice insurance.  Especially in claims-
made medical malpractice insurance (the only kind of medical mal-
practice insurance available in the individual physician market in most
states), the length of the tail should not be any longer than that for
high-value automobile injury claims brought against defendants with
large amounts of insurance.100  For ordinary automobile accident de-
fendants, “large amounts of insurance” are available only under per-
sonal umbrella policies, and high-value automobile accident claims
would seem to be the most significant risk insured under those poli-
cies. Yet, there was no “crisis” in personal lines umbrella insurance
policies.  As this suggests, the long tail is important but the key differ-
ence between medical malpractice and other potentially high severity
torts comes from the other factors affecting loss cost uncertainty.
C. Other Factors Affecting Loss Cost Uncertainty
As depicted in Figure 4 earlier, there are various kinds of “develop-
ments risk” that affect future losses under liability insurance policies:
injury developments risk, injury cost developments risk, standard of
care developments risk, legal developments risk, and claiming devel-
opments risk.101  Injury developments are changes affecting the fre-
quency or severity of injuries potentially subject to a liability claim,
such as technological change.  Injury cost developments are changes
affecting the costs of those injuries, such as medical inflation.  Stan-
dard of care developments are changes affecting our understanding of
whether an injury results from negligent behavior, such as new medi-
cal techniques or safety practices that make old ways of practicing
medicine substandard.  Legal developments are changes in the rele-
vant “law on the books” (such as the elimination of the locality rule)
or the “law in action” (such as increased selectivity by a plaintiff’s
medical malpractice specialists).  Claiming developments is a catchall
term for other changes that affect the propensity to claim, such as per-
100. This conclusion is based on inference.  As I learned in the interviews reported in Tom
Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001), personal injury lawyers delay filing high-value personal injury claims
until either the plaintiff has reached “maximum medical improvement” or the statute of limita-
tions is approaching.  As a result a high-value auto claim will not be filed until at least several
years after the accident.  Thus, even if it does take longer to resolve medical malpractice litiga-
tion than high-value auto accident litigation (a reasonable inference), the “occurrence” basis of
the umbrella insurance coverage will mean that the tail for umbrella policies should be about the
same as for claims-made medical malpractice policies.  I have not located a publicly available
data source that allows me to determine the tail for personal lines umbrella policies.
101. See generally Baker, supra note 9. R
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ceptions regarding the social acceptability of bringing a medical mal-
practice claim.102
As compared to automobile liability and other aspects of “ordi-
nary” tort law, medical malpractice seems likely to pose a wider range
of risks in each of these five categories.  The wider range of risks
means that there is much more room for error in predicting future loss
costs and, thus, more room for judgment to be affected by the pres-
sures of the underwriting cycle.
1. Injury Developments Risk
The rate of medical malpractice injuries is to some extent a function
of medical-related activity.103  Thus, the increasing “medicalization”
of society creates the potential for increased rates of medical malprac-
tice.104  On the other hand, the safety movement currently under way
in medical practice has the potential to reduce the rate of medical
malpractice.  In addition, there are rapid technological and organiza-
tional innovations taking place in many areas of medical practice that,
though not motivated by patient safety, will undoubtedly have conse-
quences for patient safety, both for good and bad.105  As a result of all
these changes, any attempt to predict the number and type of medical
malpractice injuries must allow for a large margin of error.
2. Injury Cost Developments Risk
The most important factor that affects the cost of medical malprac-
tice injuries is the cost of medical care, which is also the most impor-
tant factor affecting the cost of most personal injury claims.106
Because medical malpractice claims generally involve more severe in-
102. Id.  Cf. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981) (articulating a framework for
understanding how injuries lead to claims).
103. As Ericson and Doyle’s research demonstrates, injury developments risk is also a func-
tion of changing conceptions of what constitutes an injury. See ERICSON & DOYLE, supra note
22, at 99–100.  It is possible that medical malpractice may also pose special risks regarding what R
constitutes an injury.
104. See William F. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and the Medical Malpractice
Crisis, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 10, 14–15 (discussing the significance of medical pro-
gress and industrialization to the growth of malpractice liabilities). Cf. Mark F. Grady, Why Are
People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion,
82 NW. U. L. REV. 293 (1988) (suggesting that advances in medical technology increase the
opportunity for injuries from inattention and other failures of “nondurable” precautions).
105. See generally Grady, supra note 104.
106. See generally Seabury et al., supra note 76.  Note that “injury costs” here are not the R
same as what is referred to in the insurance claims practice as “severity.”  Injury cost develop-
ments are things that affect the cost of treating a given injury.  Severity is affected by a combina-
tion of injury developments and injury cost developments.
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juries than other kinds of tort claims, increases in the costs of medical
care have a larger impact on medical malpractice claims.  Other im-
portant factors affecting injury cost include wages and norms regard-
ing noneconomic damages.107  Because the intensity of medical
encounters rises with age, it seems likely that wage loss is compara-
tively less important for medical malpractice injuries, with the result
that a greater percentage of medical malpractice injury costs are ex-
posed to medical cost inflation.108  Thus, the trend across all lines of
liability insurance toward the increasing significance of medical ex-
penses may be even more accelerated for medical malpractice
liabilities.109
With regard to the noneconomic damages component, some re-
search suggests that norms regarding noneconomic damages are dif-
ferent in medical malpractice claims than in ordinary tort claims.110
Because we lack a persuasive explanation for this difference, it is a
source of uncertainty with regard to future medical malpractice injury
costs.  There are reasons to believe that juries will become compara-
tively more generous in awarding noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases.  For example, noneconomic damages are the most
obvious “punishment” component of “compensatory” damages,111
and the managed care backlash and general de-throning of doctors
suggest that juries may become more willing to punish medical mal-
practice.  At the same time, however, there are also reasons to believe
that juries will become comparatively less generous in awarding
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.  For example,
public opinion polling suggests that there is public support for the idea
107. See generally Stephen Daniels, Tracing the Shadow of the Law: Jury Verdicts in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 4 (1990).
108. The prevalence of birth-related medical malpractice claims (as opposed to medical mal-
practice injuries) might skew this relationship.  On the other hand, the very substantial and ex-
pensive advances in what can be done to ameliorate birth-related injuries and to prolong the life
of injured children seems likely to more than offset whatever wage loss effects result from this
age skew in medical malpractice claims.
109. In workers’ compensation, for example, the medical component of workers’ compensa-
tion payments has grown from 40% in 1982 to 53% in 2002. See Robert Hartwig, Ins. Info. Inst.,
Liability Trends, Issues and Jury Verdicts: Impact on Insurance Liability and Excess Casualty
Markets, slides 122, 122–24 (Oct. 2002) (unpublished PowerPoint presentation, on file with the
DePaul Law Review) (using data from NCCI).
110. See DONALD N. DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING
THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 100 (1996) (reporting that medical malpractice damage awards are higher
than automobile or products liability awards for similar injuries).
111. Cf. Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive
Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 226–28 (describing how lawyers use aggravated fault to en-
hance compensatory damages).
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that malpractice awards are too high.112  Field research by scholars
Daniels and Martin suggests that tort reform campaigns reduce juries’
noneconomic damages awards, independent of damages caps.113  In
addition, states continue to adopt caps on noneconomic damages.114
As a result of both these factors—the greater significance of medical
costs and the greater uncertainty about future norms regarding
noneconomic damages—the potential range of injury cost develop-
ments appears wider for medical malpractice than for other kinds of
personal injuries.
3. Standard of Care Developments Risk
Medical practitioners face three kinds of standard of care develop-
ment risks.  First, advances in medical practice continually raise the
bar under the traditional, profession-centered medical malpractice
standard.  New diagnostic techniques, new medicines, and new patient
safety procedures all mean that injuries that formerly may have been
understood as nobody’s fault, are now the fault of the physician who
did not use the new technique, medicine, or procedure.115  Second, as
Professor Mark Grady has explained, new medical technologies create
new opportunities to diagnose and treat illness, but they do not elimi-
nate the need for physician attention and related “non-durable” pre-
cautions.116  Wonderful new advances in medical care create new
opportunities for physicians to make the kind of ordinary mistakes
that our system of negligence liability does not excuse (e.g., misread-
ing a dial or forgetting to use a fetal monitor).117  Third, there are
suggestions that the basic medical malpractice liability ground rule—
that the standard of care is determined by examining what is done by
most doctors—may be giving way to the risk-benefit rule that applies
in other areas of tort law.118
112. See University of Connecticut, Center for Survey Research and Analysis, UConn Poll
(Apr. 1, 2004).
113. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact that It Has Had Is Between People’s
Ears”: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000).
114. See generally Elizabeth S. Poisson, Comment, Addressing the Impropriety of Statutory
Caps on Pain and Suffering Awards in the Medical Liability System, 82 N.C. L. REV. 759 (2004).
115. Cf. John B. McKinlay, From Promising Report to Standard Procedure: Seven Stages in the
Career of a Medical Innovation, 59 MILBANK MEM’L FUND Q. 374 (1981) (describing diffusion of
medical advances).
116. See generally Grady, supra note 104.  It is worth noting that the medical malpractice R
“explosion” to which Professor Grady referred in this article was a rapid increase in incurred
losses, not developed losses (see supra fig. 2), demonstrating that good theoretical insights can
nevertheless come from flawed empirical motivations.
117. See generally id.
118. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The Leapfrog Standards: Ready to Jump from Marketplace
to Courtroom?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 46.
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4. Legal Developments Risk
My impression is that the most significant legal developments are
taking place “in action” rather than “on the books.”  Examples in-
clude increased selectivity among medical malpractice specialists, im-
provements in the dissemination of information as a result of
information technology, and growth in access to experts.119
5. Claiming Developments Risk
The medical malpractice arena faces extraordinary claiming devel-
opment risks.  As a result of the public health research of the last dec-
ade, we now know that there are an enormous number of medical
malpractice injuries and relatively few claims,120 at a time when norms
and expectations about health care are in significant flux.  This creates
the possibility for significant growth that, once a tipping point in social
norms is reached, could become a virtual explosion of claims.121
D. Moral Hazard
There are several aspects of the medical malpractice market that
may make both its buyers and sellers even less sensitive to insolvency
risk than in the liability insurance market generally.  On the insurance
purchasing side, physicians and other noninstitutional medical care
providers are relatively judgment proof, at least as compared to other
high-value litigation targets, and, thus, may feel adequately protected
by the $300,000 per claim maximum amount that insurance guaranty
funds will pay.122  The existence of residual market institutions in
119. Steven Yeazell has written about these developments generally. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001). I am not aware of these develop-
ments having been studied specifically with regard to medical malpractice, but medical malprac-
tice is among the most information and expert intensive forms of tort litigation. See Samuel
Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (reporting that 97% of all medical mal-
practice cases used experts and that medical malpractice cases had an average of five experts,
compared to overall average of 3.3 experts among cases using experts).
120. See CAL. MED. ASS’N & CAL. HOSP. ASS’N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEA-
SIBILITY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed., 1977); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRAC-
TICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 62 (1993);
Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349
THE LANCET 309, 312 (1997); Troyen Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence
in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practices Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
370 (1991); Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in
Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261 (2000).
121. THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 101–07 (1978).
122. As described in more detail in Blood Money, personal injury lawyers report that they
refrain from attempting to pursue defendants’ assets for both moral and practical reasons. See
generally Baker, supra note 100.  Given the incentive structure of the tort/liability insurance R
system described in that article, the guaranty fund amount is probably “enough” insurance be-
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some states123 may further reduce medical providers’ incentives to
monitor the solvency risk of medical malpractice insurers.  The guar-
anty fund protects individual providers against claims under current
policies and the residual market mechanism protects those providers
against the possibility of being without insurance in the future.
On the insurance selling side, physician-controlled mutual insurance
companies have a very significant market share in many states.  Be-
cause of their nonprofit, quasi-public interest status—serving in states
such as Connecticut as the de facto residual market institution—their
managers are likely to believe that insurance regulators will make ex-
traordinary efforts to avoid declaring them insolvent.  Moreover, lack-
ing shareholders to demand profits, managers of mutuals have even
greater incentive than managers of stock insurance companies to max-
imize market share.   As a result, a mutual insurer has less incentive
than stock insurers to apply the underwriting brakes in the final phase
of the soft market and, accordingly, may be more likely to maintain
below-cost pricing in order to preserve, or even expand, market share
in a soft market.
E. Capacity Constraint
The long tail and comparatively high uncertainty in estimating fu-
ture losses combine to produce a comparatively large risk overhang in
medical malpractice insurance.  A large risk overhang can be expected
to magnify the capacity constraint.  The larger the risk overhang, the
more current assets have to be set aside to offset the newly strength-
ened reserves, and the greater the reduction in capacity in the early
part of the hard market.  This “amplification” of the capacity con-
straint helps explain why medical malpractice insurance prices rise so
significantly in the hard market phase of the cycle.
F. Greed and Fear
To the degree that emotion explains aspects of the underwriting cy-
cle, the comparatively larger uncertainty in medical malpractice loss
costs seems likely to exacerbate the effect of emotion.  The impor-
cause (a) the physician’s behavior will not be understood to have violated the implied “duty to
insure” (the physician is very unlikely to be blamed for the insolvency of the insurer), and (b) the
possibility of getting a relatively easy $300,000 from the guaranty fund will discourage the plain-
tiff and lawyer from undertaking the effort and delay needed to obtain a judgment in excess of
that amount against the doctor who can escape responsibility in whole or in large part through
bankruptcy.
123. See FRANK A. SLOAN, PUBLIC MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE (Report of the Pew
Charitable Trusts Project on Med. Liability in Pa., Mar. 2004), http://medliabilitypa.org/research/
files/sloan0304.pdf.
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tance of nonprofit, physician-owned mutual insurers may make the
term “greed” less appropriate for the emotion that supports optimistic
pricing during the soft market.  Perhaps the term “desire for ap-
proval” would be more appropriate in this context.  But “fear” would
surely be the correct term for the emotion that helps ignite a hard
market.
G. Institutional Incentives
As already noted, the prevalence of physician-controlled mutual
companies is a unique institutional feature of the medical malpractice
insurance market.  While there are, to my knowledge, no public re-
ports describing the compensation arrangements within the medical
mutuals, it seems likely that the mutuals are more likely than stock
companies to maximize market share rather than profits, for the rea-
sons discussed above.124  This bias toward lowering price to maintain
market share seems likely to be exacerbated by the very high visibility
of medical malpractice insurance premiums within the medical office
and, thus, the significant likelihood that medical providers will “shop”
medical malpractice insurance in order to find the lowest price.  This
seems especially likely in the most recent soft market, which occurred
at a time when medical providers were facing declining reimburse-
ment rates due to the intense efforts by financial intermediaries such
as Medicare, Medicaid, and managed care companies to cut costs.125
H. The Winner’s Curse and Herd Behavior
As with interest rates, these factors would not seem to affect medi-
cal malpractice insurance in any special way.  Similarly, the relatively
high degree of uncertainty in medical malpractice costs will magnify
the effects of the winner’s curse and herd behavior.
IV. SHOULD REGULATORS ACT TO MODERATE THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CYCLE?
Understanding the dynamics of the insurance underwriting cycle
provides some basis for developing regulatory strategies to ameliorate
that cycle.  One possible response is to replace market-based prices
with administrative prices, and attempt to limit price declines in the
soft market and price increases during the hard market, as the State of
124. See supra text accompanying notes 92–95. R
125. See Gary Young, Federal Tax-Exemption Requirements for Joint Ventures Between Non-
Profit Hospital Providers and For-Profit Entities: Form over Substance, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L.
327, 339–40 (2004).
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New York appears to have done with some success during the
1995–2004 period.126  If in fact that can be done, would it be a good
idea?
As Mark Geistfeld’s article in this Symposium discusses, the real
problem with medical malpractice is not that malpractice premiums
are too high, but rather that medical malpractice liability does not
provide enough incentive for patient safety, because of the low en-
forcement rate.127  In other words, even at the height of the hard mar-
ket, total medical malpractice insurance premiums are less than the
costs of medical malpractice.  If anything, medical malpractice insur-
ance premiums are too low from a deterrence perspective.
This means that medical malpractice insurance crises may have ben-
eficial effects.  If an insurance crisis magnifies the impact of medical
liability—and there is some reason to believe it does—then smoothing
the insurance cycle could reduce medical providers’ loss prevention
efforts.   Not all efforts to reduce liability losses are socially produc-
tive, but efforts to prevent adverse medical events surely are.  If there
is a reasonable possibility that a medical malpractice insurance crisis
increases efforts to prevent adverse medical events, then we should be
wary of efforts to dampen the upward swings in the medical malprac-
tice insurance cycle.
This Symposium is part of the proof that an insurance crisis focuses
attention on medical malpractice.  Whether that increased attention
produces increased investment in loss prevention is harder to assess.
Nevertheless, the available evidence is sufficient to justify more care-
ful and thorough research before taking significant steps to dampen
the cycle.
There does not appear to be any research documenting the rate of
investment in loss prevention efforts over time.  But research on
human decisionmaking provides support for the proposition that vola-
tile insurance premiums would lead to more significant changes in
health care systems’ loss prevention efforts than premiums that in-
creased very slowly over time.  Moreover, we can document that the
most significant research on medical malpractice came in response to
earlier medical liability insurance crises and that this research pro-
126. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice Insurance Reform: “Enterprise Insurance” and Some
Alternatives, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: NEW CENTURY,
DIFFERENT ISSUES (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds.) (Cambridge University Press, forth-
coming 2005).
127. Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Insurance and the (Il)legitimate Interests of the Medical Pro-
fession in Tort Reform, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 447 (2005).
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vided the empirical grounding that led to the recent emphasis on pa-
tient safety.
A. Behavioral Decision Research on the Impact of Salience and the
Deterrent Effect of Uncertainty
The behavioral decision research examines the effect of salience,
availability, and uncertainty on decisionmaking.128  The research on
salience corroborates the intuition that we act on the basis of what we
notice.129  Related research on availability shows that people use their
ability to imagine and recall events in evaluating the risk of those
events occurring in the future.  This means that “discussion of a low
probability hazard may increase its memorability and hence its per-
ceived riskiness, regardless of what the evidence indicates.”130  People
are more likely to buy flood insurance after a flood,131 they are more
likely to buy earthquake insurance in the wake of publicity about
earthquake assessments,132 and it seems reasonable to conclude that
they are more likely to try to do something about medical malpractice
during or immediately after a medical liability insurance crisis.133
A medical liability insurance crisis makes medical malpractice more
salient, with the result that stories about medical malpractice liability
and lawsuits are more available to medical providers and other people
who make decisions about efforts to prevent medical injuries.  One
demonstration of the impact of an insurance crisis on the salience of
medical malpractice can be seen from simple counting of news stories
that refer to medical malpractice.  Figure 5 below shows the results of
this simple content analysis in the LexisNexis “All News” database
from 1990 to the present in terms of both raw article counts and the
rate of change in article counts over time.  While part of the increase
over time seems likely to be due to the expansion of the LexisNexis
128. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter UNCERTAINTY].
129. See, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 128, at 190. R
130. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in UNCERTAINTY,
supra note 128, at 465. R
131. HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS (1978).
132. Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions and Insurance Decisions, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
133. Other observers have noted the fact that doctors’ perceptions of their risk of liability
greatly exceeds “what would be expected from a simple calculation of the true statistical risk of
suit.” See WEILER ET AL., supra note 120, at 126.  My argument is that medical liability insur- R
ance crises are one of the reasons why doctors have such inflated perceptions of their risk and,
moreover, that these inflated perceptions help make up for the very low enforcement rate.
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database, the very sharp increase that begins in 2002 and peaks in
2003 coincides with the hard market.
FIGURE 5
SIMPLE CONTENT ANALYSIS: ARTICLES WITH “MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE” IN LEXIS NEXIS “ALLNEWS FILE”
DATABASE, 1990–2004
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Similar article counts using the largest public access database of
medical publications (PubMed) show similar results extending back in
time to include the hard markets of the 1970s and 1980s.  Figure 6
below shows the results of this simple content analysis in terms of the
rate of change in article counts over time.  There are very clear peaks
that coincide with the onset of each of the three hard markets in medi-
cal malpractice insurance.
Although the behavioral decision research on the deterrent effects
of uncertainty is not as well developed as the research on salience and
availability, the existing research provides another reason to believe
that insurance crises magnify the deterrence signal of medical liabil-
ity.134  The idea is as follows: Experimental research suggests that in-
creasing the uncertainty regarding either the probability of detection
or the size of a sanction increases the deterrent effect of a potential
sanction, holding the expected value of that sanction constant.135
Rapid increases in medical liability insurance fuel the perception that
medical malpractice is out of control, that there is no link between
“true” liability and the chance of being sued, and that medical mal-
134. See Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89
IOWA L. REV. 443, 478–88 (2004).
135. See id.
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FIGURE 6
SIMPLE CONTENT ANALYSIS: ANNUAL % CHANGE IN NUMBER OF
MALPRACTICE ARTICLES IN PUBMED DATABASE, 1969–2003
PubMed: “Malpractice” or “Liability” or “Negligence” in Title or Abstract
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practice damages awards are widely uncertain.136  Thus, a medical
malpractice insurance crisis not only increases the salience of medical
malpractice, it also increases the perceived uncertainty regarding both
the possibility of being sued for malpractice and the amount of dam-
ages that will be assessed in the event of suit.  This increase in per-
ceived uncertainty increases the deterrence provided by medical
liability.
B. Medical Liability Insurance Crises Produce Significant Research
on Medical Malpractice
Research on medical malpractice provides one of the mechanisms
through which the crisis-induced salience of medical malpractice may
produce action on the hospital floor.  The California Medical Society
commissioned the first large-scale effort to measure medical malprac-
tice during the crisis of the mid-1970s,137 and the State of New York
commissioned the famous Harvard study of New York hospital
records during the crisis of the mid-1980s.138  These studies and a fol-
136. In part, this perception is fostered by the liability insurance industry as a way to avoid
blame for the insurance crisis. See generally, e.g., TILLINGHAST REPORT, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2002
UPDATE, TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM (2003).  The Tilling-
hast Report uses incurred loss statistics as the measure of the costs of the tort system and ex-
plains the periodic jumps in incurred losses as resulting from rapid increases in liability.
137. See generally CAL. MED. ASS’N & CAL. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 120; WEILER ET AL., R
supra note 120, Andrews et al., supra note 120. See Thomas et al., supra note 120, at 261–71, 312. R
138. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL, at xi (1991).
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low-up study of Colorado and Utah hospital records139 provided the
empirical foundation for the Institute of Medicine’s influential report,
To Err Is Human.140  That report is widely credited with focusing
health care providers and health care researchers on protecting pa-
tient safety.141
The link between medical malpractice insurance crises, the Institute
of Medicine report, and patient safety efforts can be documented
through content analyses similar to those above.  Although this con-
tent analysis does not show the same dramatic link between the insur-
ance crises and literature on medical safety as it does between the
insurance crises and the literature on medical malpractice, the analysis
does show a link.  Moreover, it documents an increasing attention to
safety in the medical literature since the 1970s.  Figure 7 shows the
number of articles with “safe” or “safety” in the title from 1969 to
2003 and two measures of the rate of change in the article counts over
time (the yearly rate of change and a five-year moving average rate of
change).  While the overall trend is steadily increasing, there is a very
sharp increase that coincides with the hard market of the mid-1970s
and a remarkable upward trend that takes off in the mid to late 1980s.
Figure 8 shows the number of articles with “patient safety” in the
title or abstract during the same period.  “Patient safety” is almost
invisible until the mid-1990s and does not become a significant feature
in the literature until after 1999.142  The most significant patient safety
development of 2000 was the publication of the Institute of Medicine
report.143
C. Summary
While this evidence does not prove that medical malpractice insur-
ance crises have lead to greater improvements in patient safety than
would have occurred otherwise, it does provide some support for that
conclusion.  At a minimum, this evidence justifies research directed at
evaluating the connection between investments in injury prevention
139. Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah
and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261–71 (2000).
140. See INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 29
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
141. See generally, e.g., Donald Berwisk, Errors Today and Errors Tomorrow, 348 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2570 (2003); Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exag-
gerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000); Robert A. McNutt et al., Patient Safety Efforts Should Focus on
Medical Errors, 287 JAMA 1997 (2002).
142. Indeed, the number of articles written before the late 1990s is too small to make the rate
of change a significant measure.
143. See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 140.
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FIGURE 7
SIMPLE CONTENT ANALYSIS: ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF ARTICLES WITH “SAFE” OR “SAFETY” IN PUBMED
DATABASE, 1969–2003
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PubMed: “Safety” in title or abstract PubMed: “Safety” or “Safe” in title
and insurance crises.  In addition, it suggests that efforts to control the
insurance cycle could have undesirable unintended consequences.
Thus, efforts to dampen the medical malpractice insurance underwrit-
FIGURE 8
SIMPLE CONTENT ANALYSIS: ANNUAL NUMBER OF ARTICLES WITH
“PATIENT SAFETY” IN PUBMED DATABASE, 1969–2003
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ing cycle should be coupled with programs to support injury preven-
tion.  Even if the underwriting cycle provides less spur to injury
prevention than this evidence suggests, the low rate of medical mal-
practice enforcement means that there is very little risk that a new
injury prevention “carrot” would combine with the malpractice
“stick” to produce an overinvestment in medical injury prevention.
\\server05\productn\D\DPL\54-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 44 10-MAY-05 11:05
436 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:393
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is my hope that this exploration of the medical liability insurance
underwriting cycle has persuasively explained the following main
points:
• The underwriting cycle has a combination of institutional and be-
havioral causes that produce a prolonged, gradual price-cutting
trend in competitive insurance markets, punctuated by compara-
tively short periods of rapid increases in insurance prices and re-
duction in insurance capacity.
• The sharp increase in incurred loss expenses that accompanies the
onset of a hard insurance market should properly be regarded as
an effect of the insurance underwriting cycle and not a cause of
the hard market.
• The comparatively wide swings of medical malpractice insurance
prices over the course of the underwriting cycle are likely to be
attributable to the large risk overhang produced by the interac-
tion of a long tail with a comparatively high degree of uncertainty
regarding loss expenses, and, to a lesser but still important de-
gree, institutional arrangements and incentives that partially insu-
late medical malpractice insurance buyers and sellers from the
insolvency risks posed by below-cost pricing.
• There is some evidence that the medical malpractice insurance
underwriting cycle may promote patient safety by drawing atten-
tion to the problem of medical malpractice in a manner that
makes medical liability more salient and induces greater efforts to
prevent medical injuries.
In concluding, I would like to offer four additional reasons why tort
scholars and policymakers should care about the underwriting cycle in
medical malpractice insurance.
First, the cycle is disruptive to medical care providers, particularly
physicians in high-risk specialties.  If we think about medical malprac-
tice insurance as a kind of mandatory group savings plan, it is easy to
see why it is very disruptive to require people to save different
amounts of money at different times.  This is particularly true when
medical care providers are increasingly unable to raise prices in re-
sponse to increased costs.  The disruption may promote patient safety,
to be sure, but it has other negative effects that have to be managed.
Second, hard markets and medical provider complaints fuel suspi-
cions about law and lawyers.  Sharp price increases give substance to
claims about the “litigation explosion,” most likely through the availa-
bility heuristic discussed in Part IV, notwithstanding the substantial
empirical research demonstrating that this explosion is a myth.
Third, hard markets are a trigger for legislative efforts to limit tort
remedies.  It is no coincidence that California’s Medical Injury Com-
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pensation Reform Act144 came during the hard market of the 1970s,
the largest round of tort reform came during the hard market of the
1980s, and the recent round of tort reform came during the hard mar-
ket that began in 2001.  The public attention given to insurance availa-
bility during the hard market phases of the medical malpractice
underwriting cycle helped shift the development of tort law from
courts to legislatures.
This shift has a structural impact on the development of tort law.  In
legislatures, tort reform advocates are able to frame certain classes of
defendants as “victims” of tort law in a way that simply cannot be
done in the courtroom.  In the courtroom, tort law grows through an
encounter between individuals, not factions or interest groups.   The
aspects of medical malpractice liability that tort reformers find most
objectionable—noneconomic damages145 and to a lesser extent joint
and several liability—come into play only once the jury or judge has
decided that the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.  At
that point, the only “victim” is the plaintiff.  The defendant is a perpe-
trator.  The situation in the legislature is very different.  Doctors as a
class, especially those in high-risk specialties like obstetrics, can easily
be framed as the “victims” of sudden, very large increases in insurance
premiums.
The underwriting cycle affects not only the timing and location of
efforts to limit tort law remedies, but also the content of those efforts.
Tort reform efforts have focused most intensely on aspects of tort law
that make claims more difficult to value, such as joint and several lia-
bility and noneconomic damages, and thus contribute to the uncer-
tainty that is the basic fuel of the underwriting cycle.146
Fourth, swings in the underwriting cycle complicate efforts to un-
derstand the role that medical malpractice liability and medical mal-
practice liability insurance play in deterring medical malpractice.147
On one hand, price declines during soft markets may dampen the in-
centives provided by risk-based pricing, just as the loosening of under-
144. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (codified at CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003), CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1997), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 340.5, 1295 (West 1982)).
145. See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Noneconomic Damages, TORT REFORM
RECORD, Dec. 31, 2001, http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi/7437_tort-record.htm (stating that
“ATRA believes that the broad and basically unguided discretion given to juries in awarding
damages for noneconomic loss is the single greatest contributor to the inequities and inefficien-
cies of the tort liability system”).
146. Id.
147. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2002).
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writing standards may reduce the ability of insurers to demand that
applicants engage in costly loss prevention measures.  On the other
hand, the sharp price increases of a hard market seem likely to make
liability and loss prevention more salient than would a slow, gradual
price increase.  As a result, hard markets may foster more aggressive
and persistent loss prevention measures.  Similarly, the salience of lia-
bility and insurance in hard markets may lead medical providers to
believe that malpractice litigation is more frequent and more success-
ful for plaintiffs than in fact is the case.  This misperception may make
tort law a more effective deterrent than the low rate of claiming would
suggest.
